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Despite the resurgence of interest in the medieval conception of memory 
among scholars working in a wide variety of disciplines within medieval 
studies, little attention has been paid in recent times to the conception of 
memory found in the psychological writings of medieval philosophers, 
especially those from the Arabic tradition.' Scholars interested in this Ara- 
bic material have had to rely on outdated studies of the internal senses in 
general, many of which were focused solely on the classificatory schemes 
and cerebral localization of these faculties to the neglect of their interest 
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Twenty-eighth Interna- 
tional Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, Michigan, May 8,1993, and in the 
Bradley Lecture Series at Boston College, November 5, 1993. I am grateful to 
Muhsin Mahdi of Harvard University for his helpful comments on the paper as part 
of the Bradley Lecture Series. 
1. Most work on medieval conceptions of memory has been undertaken by 
scholars of Western medieval literature or history; some are focused on memory, 
whereas others treat the internal senses as a whole. One of the oldest such studies 
is Murray Wright Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medimal  Thought, 
University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, vol. 12, nos. 2-3 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1928); Averroes is discussed on pp. 185-86. Arabic 
authors are not considered by Frances Yates in her classic work, The Art of Memoi-y 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), but they are mentioned briefly as 
background to Western authors in Mary Carruthers's more recent The Book of 
Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). By the same token, Nicholas Steneck's "The Problem of the Internal 
Senses in the Fourteenth Century," Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 
1970, considers Arabic authors only in reference to their use by Latin authors. 
Averroes does receive an entire chapter in Janet Coleman's Ancient and Medieual 
Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), pp. 401-15, but the treatment is solely from the perspective of the 
Latin translation, and no attempt is made to situate Averroes's views on memory in 
the context of his overall philosophy nor in the Arabic philosophical tradition as a 
whole. By far the best and most philosophical consideration of memory and the 
other internal senses in Averroes occurs in Michael Blaustein, "Averroes on the 
Imagination and the Intellect," Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 
1985, although my interpretation differs in several important respects. 
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for medieval cognitive theory and epistemology.2 The present study at-
tempts to remedy this lacuna by examining the theory of memory pre-
sented by Averroes in his psychological writings, especially his early Epitome
of the "Parυa naturalia. " 3 I hope to show that Averroes's account of memory
is more complex than has often been assumed and that he accords to
memory a central place within any complete act of sense cognition.4 I
begin by examining the place of memory within Averroes's account of the
internal sense faculties in order to show that he conceives of memory as
a perceptual faculty, not merely a retentive one. Memory is not the faculty
whereby we retain past perceptions or are aware of the past as past but
rather the faculty by which we grasp the individual as such.5 This claim
will be substantiated through a consideration of the two basic activities of
2. The study of the classificatory schemes of the internal senses in general is
indebted to the pioneering and almost single-handed efforts of H. A. Wolfson, "The
Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophical Texts," "Isaac Israeli on
the Internal Senses," "Notes on Isaac Israeli's Internal Senses," and "Maimonides
on the Internal Senses," all reprinted in H. A. Wolfson, Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Religion, 2 vols., ed. I. Twersky and G. H. Williams (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 250-370. Also relevant to Averroes is H.
Gatje, "Die 'inneren Sinne' bei Averroes," Zeitschήft der deutschen morgenlάndischen
Gesellschaft 115 (1965): 255-93. The notes to Fazlur Rahman's translation of the
psychology of Avicenna's Najάh, Avicenna's Psychology (Oxford, 1952; Westport,
Conn.: Hyperion, 1981), pp. 77-83, also contain helpful discussions of the internal
sense tradition as a whole.
3. The following abbreviations are used for Averroes's works:
EPN: Epitome of the "Parva naturalia " (Talkfus kitab al-hiss wa-al-mahsΰs —1170), ed. H.
A. Blumberg (Cambridge, Mass: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1972); medieval
Latin translations in A. L. Shields and H. A. Blumberg, eds., Compendia librorum
Aήstotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur (Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of
America, 1949). References are given first to the Arabic text, preceded by the
siglum A, then to the Latin, preceded by the siglum L. There are in fact two Latin
versions, the vulgata and the paήsiana, the former of which is more faithful to the
Arabic original. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the vulgata. There
is also an English translation by Blumberg, Epitome of 'Parva naturalia" (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1961), which I have consulted;
however, all translations in the text and notes are my own.
EDA: Epitome of the "De anima " (Talkhis kitab al-nafs—ca. 1159, but twice revised), ed. A.
F. Al-Ahwani (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahdah al-Misrίyah, 1950). All translations are
my own.
GCDA: Great Commentary on the "De anima" (Commentaήum magnum in Aήstotelis De
anima libros—ca. 1190), ed. F. S. Crawford (Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy
of America, 1953). References are given to book and comment numbers, followed
by the page and line numbers in Crawford's edition. All translations are my own.
4. By "complete" here I mean the grasping of a sensible particular as an integral
whole accompanied by all or most of its relevant proper, common, and incidental
sensible qualities. For example, Zayd, a red apple, and a black cat would count as
complete perceptual acts, but seeing red or black, hearing a loud sound, or seeing
something moving would not.
5. A preliminary terminological note is in order here. In his psychological
writings, particularly the EPN, Averroes (along with most of his commentators) is
not always careful to differentiate between the faculty of memory as a distinct internal
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the internal senses that Averroes associates with the use of the memorative
faculty, analysis or abstraction {al-tahUl/divisio) and synthesis or composi-
tion {al-tarUb/couvpoύύo). Moreover, I argue that my interpretation of
Averroist memory as a perceptual faculty can be further supported by
analogy with Averroes's account of the parallel activities in the intellect.
Finally, I suggest that while Averroes's view of memory is a plausible one
in its own right, his account is not without its ambiguities, particularly in
the light of his understanding of the metaphysical status of individuals.
MEMORY'S PLACE AMONG THE POWERS OF THE SOUL
Averroes's general purpose in the De memoήa chapter6 of the Epitome of the
"Parva naturalia" is to establish the existence of a special memorative fac-
ulty, closely tied to imagination in its scope, yet locally and functionally
distinct from it.7 Since this in itself represents a move away from Aristotle
toward the more rigid demarcation of faculties characteristic of the internal
sense tradition, it will be useful to begin with a few general remarks on that
tradition, especially as it culminates in Avicenna.
All of Avicenna's philosophical discussions of the internal senses pre-
sent a fivefold classification of faculties in which the distinction between
perceptual and retentive faculties plays a pivotal role.8 The internal senses
thus include two perceptual-retentive pairs: (1) the common sense (al-hiss
sense power and the activities of retaining, remembering, recollecting, and so on
in which this faculty is involved. Al-dhikr in Arabic is used to mean both "memory"
as a faculty and "remembering" as an activity. The present discussion is concerned
with the determination of the nature and function of the faculty of memory in
Averroes's cognitive psychology, and it is to this problem that its conclusion per-
tains. Although it is only by examining the various activities in which the memora-
tive faculty is involved—remembering (al-dhikr/rememoratio), retention
(al-hifz /conservatio), and recollection (al-tadhakkur/investigare per rememorationem or
reminiscentia in the paήsiana)—that the cognitive function of the faculty itself is to
be determined, it becomes clear in what follows that the memorative faculty cannot
accomplish any of these activities without operating in concert with a number of
other internal sense powers.
6. Averroes treats the Parva naturalia as a single work, divided into individual
treatises or books. He tells us (EPN, A2-3) that the only books known to him at the
time of composing his epitome were De sensu et sensato (bk. 1); De memoήa, De somno,
and De insomniis and De divinatione (chaps. 1, 2, and 3—comprising both the De
insomniis and De divinatione—of bk. 2) and the De longitudine et brevitate vitae (bk 3).
7. By "locally distinct" I refer to the standard physiological component of the
internal sense tradition, which locates each faculty in a specific ventricle of the
brain.
8. The principal texts are Al-Najahed. M. T. Danishpazhuh (Tehran: Danishgah
Tehran, 1985), pp. 327-30, 344-49; English translation in Rahman, Avicenna's
Psychology, pp. 30-31, 38-40; and Al-Shifa': Al-Nafs, ed. F. Rahman, Avicenna's 'De
anima," Being the Psychological Part of Kitab al-Shifa' (Oxford: Oxford University
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al-mushtarak), which perceives the proper and common sensible forms
conveyed by the external senses, and the formative imagination (al-
khayal/al-musawwirah), which retains these forms; and (2) the estimative
faculty (aί-wahm), which perceives what Avicenna calls nonsensible "inten-
tions" (ma'am), and the memory (al-dhikr), which retains those intentions.
Intentions for Avicenna are principally illustrated by affective properties
such as fear, hostility, and love, but they also include a number of other
properties, among them Aristotelian incidental perceptions such as "the
yellow is honey and sweet."9 Avicenna also posits a fifth faculty, the compo-
sitive imagination (al-mutakhayyilah), which combines and divides the forms
and intentions perceived and retained by the other faculties. This faculty,
however, has two aspects in humans, for when it is directed by the rational
soul it is properly called the cogitative (al-mufakkirah/al-fikr), or sometimes
the discriminative (al-mumayyizah), faculty.
The details of this Avicennian scheme are complex, and they are not
all adopted by Averroes. But for our present purposes two related points are
of note. The first is that memory is, for Avicenna, explicitly and only a
retentive faculty: it merely preserves the intentions that the estimative
faculty had previously grasped. The second is that although Averroes ac-
cepts the terminology of "intentions," he implicitly eliminates the estimative
faculty in all of his writings, eventually rejecting it outright in the Incoherence
of "The Incoherence. ' 1 0 So memory cannot continue to play the exact same
retentive role that it was assigned by Avicenna. The situation is further
complicated by Averroes's consistent treatment of the cogitative faculty as a
human internal sense power in its own right, despite the elimination of
animal compositive imagination. Thus, Averroes ends up with a fourfold
schema of internal sense powers within the human soul (which he attributes
to Aristotle himself): the common sense, the imagination, the cogitative
faculty, and memory.11 If one sees the cogitative faculty in Averroes as
Press, 1959), pp. 43-45, 58-61, 163-69; medieval Latin translation, S. Van Riet, ed.,
Avicenna Latinus: Liber de anima, sen sextus de naturalibus, 2 vols. (Louvain: Peeters,
1968; Leiden: Brill, 1972), vol. 1, pp. 85-90, 114-20; vol. 2, pp. 1-11. For a consid-
eration of the estimative faculty in Avicenna and the Averroist and Ghazalian
critiques, see D. L. Black, "Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psycho-
logical Dimensions," Dialogue 32 (1993): 219-58.
9. See Shifa': De anima 4.1, p. 166; Liber de anima, vol. 2, p. 7.
10. See Tahafut al-Tahafut (Incoherence of "The Incoherence"—ca. 1180), ed. M.
Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930), pp. 543-53; English translation by
S. Van Den Bergh, Averroes' "TaKafut al-Tahafut" 2 vols. (Cambridge: E. J. Gibb
Memorial Trust, 1954), vol. 1, pp. 333-41. Blumberg's translation of the EPN
obscures Averroes's implicit repudiation of a distinct estimative faculty even in this
early work. Although Averroes once refers to wahm as Avicenna's term for an animal
ability that has no special name of its own (see n. 21 below), he never includes such
a faculty in his own account of memory. Rather, he refers throughout to the
"discriminative" (al-mumayyizah) faculty, that is, the purely human faculty equivalent
to cogitation, which Blumberg misleadingly translates as "estimative."
11. See GCDA 3.6, pp. 415.68-416.79.
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simply a substitute for the estimative in Avicenna, it might remain possible
for Averroes to preserve memory as nothing but a retentive capacity
roughly on a par with Avicennian memory. This has been the traditional
assumption among all of Averroes's readers since the Latin middle ages; it
is this reading that I challenge in what follows.
In keeping with the general thrust of the internal sense tradition, then,
Averroes treats memory as a distinct faculty with its own special organ, the
rear ventricle of the brain. This view of memory is in turn accompanied by
a radical reworking of the original Aristotelian arguments for the associa-
tion of memory and imagination based on the perception of time. In his
own De memoήa, Aristotle argues that memory must be a function of imagi-
nation because memory involves the perception or consciousness of time
(aisthesis chronou), that is, an awareness that what one is remembering had
been perceived before (prosaisthanesthai) .1 2 Averroes cannot, of course,
reasonably detach the notion of memory entirely from the notion of the
past, so he begins his discussion by dividing "things perceived by us" (al-
ashya' al-mudrakah la-ήa/res comprehense) into three groups: (1) those that
exist "in the now and the present time, like the perceptions of sensation";
(2) those "whose existence is anticipated in future time, namely, things
supposed [al-'uniΰr al-maznΰnah]"; and (3) "those which were perceived in
past time."13 But the division itself is carefully framed only in terms of the
temporal existence of the perceived objects and the time of their percep-
tion, that is, whether it occurred or occurs in past, present, or future time.14
No awareness of time itself is actually attributed to memory; instead, Aver-
roes merely asserts the rather obvious point, "People only remember some-
thing with which they were acquainted before, in past time."15
But if a memory is not of the past as past, then with what is it concerned
as its cognitive object, and why will it need to be differentiated from imagina-
12. Demem. 1 (449b24-50a23).
13. EPN, A36/L47; cf. De mem. 1 (449b24-29).
14. These points are clearer in the Arabic original than in either of the two
Latin versions, although the vulgata is, here as elsewhere, more accurate than the
paήsiana. It is also important to note that at this point in the argument Averroes
does not assign activities to specific faculties, as both of the Latin versions imply. He
merely points out that present objects are "like what is perceived by the senses,"
whereas memory is concerned with things past. As to anticipations of the future,
Averroes refers to them as "things supposed" (al-'umΰr al-maznΰnah ); they are not
assigned to any "estimative faculty," as might be supposed from the Latin transla-
tors' use of res existimabliles (vulgata) and virtus estimativa (paήsiana).
15. EPN, A36/L47. It is perhaps worth noting here that like all medieval
authors in the Aristotelian tradition, Averroes confines the notion of memory
proper to the realm of sensible particulars, following Aristotle's remarks at De mem.
1 (449b30-450al4) that memory belongs only incidentally to the thinking or
rational part of the soul. Questions about habitual memory and the retention of
previously learned knowledge (e.g., my remembering the Pythagorean theorem),
which are central to contemporary discussions of memory, are considered by
medieval authors in their treatments of the intellectual faculties.
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tion? Averroes admits that memory, imagination, and sensation all share a
concern with "particular, individual, things," which are "definite in quantity."
Memory-objects must, therefore, be "sensible and imaginable," and imagina-
tion is a necessary condition for the occurrence of memory; yet "even if every
act of remembering and every recollection only takes place when accompa-
nied by imagination, the notion of memory is different from the notion of
imagination, and the activity (fiΊ/actiό) of these two faculties is different."
This latter claim is then supported by the most basic of Aristotelian principles
for distinguishing powers and activities, namely, the recognition of a distinc-
tion between their cognitive objects: "The activities of the two faculties are
different because the activity of the faculty of memory is only to make present
the intention (ma'na/intentio) of the imagined thing after its loss, and to judge
of it now that this is the intention which was sensed and imagined."16
Averroes here introduces the technical term "intention" (ma'na) to
denominate the distinguishing feature of the object of memory that will
replace the Aristotelian connection between memory and the awareness of
past time.1 7 Although the association between memory and intentions is
found in Avicenna, as I have already indicated, it is noteworthy that Aver-
roes does not say here that memory simply retains intentions, but rather that
it involves both a new presentation and a new judgment of an intention as
pertaining to some previously imagined object. Unfortunately, Averroes
does not offer any definition of "intention" in this initial introduction of the
term, but its meaning begins to emerge in his subsequent analysis of the
elements that make up the complex activities of retaining and remember-
ing, on which the need for a special faculty of memory is ultimately based.
Averroes argues that four distinct components can be discerned in the
act of remembering: (1) the image (al-khayal/ymago), (2) its intention
(ma'na al-khayal/intentio illius ymaginis), (3) the presenting of the intention
(ihdar dhalika al-ma'na/facere Mam intentionem esse presentem), and (4) the
judgment of identity between the intention of the image and the past
16. EPN, A38/L49-51 (emphasis added). Averroes is somewhat careless in this
initial description of memory since he appears to attribute both the presentation
of the intention and the judgment of its identity to a past percept to memory. In
the account that follows, the judgment is consistently attributed not to the faculty
of memory itself but to the cogitative faculty.
17. The technical term ma'na poses certain difficulties because it is used
equivocally throughout the EPN. On the one hand, it serves here, as in all of
Averroes's psychological writings, as the general term for any cognitive object
insofar as it is comprehended, whether by the external or internal senses or by the
intellect. In this way it refers to the "spiritual" or "intentional" being of a known
object. Under this broad usage, any of the sensible forms perceived by any of the
internal senses can be labeled "intentions," as can intelligible concepts. On the
other hand, in the context of discussions of memory, "intention" is used as a
technical term for the object of the memorative faculty. In this special sense,
intentions are to be contrasted with images or forms. For discussion of the different
notions of intentionality in Averroes, see Blaustein, Averroes on Imagination and
Intellect, pp. 40-58, 86-87.
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sensible (al-hukm 'aΐa anna-hu ma'ria dhalika al-khayal alladhϊ Kana li-al-
mahsΰs al-mutaqaddam/iudicare earn esse intentionem illius ymagίnis que pήus
sentiebatur). From this analysis Averroes proceeds to argue that three distinct
faculties must be involved, two to account for the perception of the two
aspects of the memory-object and one to account for the judgment of
identity.18 That is, since an image is a distinct perceptual object from an
intention, the image and the intention must be perceived by different
faculties, and a third faculty must be posited to account for their ability to
be recombined. Imagination (or formation)1 9 is the presenter and percipi-
ent of the image as such; memory is the percipient of the intention (either
continuously when retentive or intermittently when memorative) 2 0 and the
cogitative faculty, under the influence of the intellect, is compositive of the
image and intention and the judge of the identity between this composite
and some past perceptual object.21 Thus, Averroes argues, it is clear that
memory and imagination must be distinct both in quiddity and in subject
(bi-al-πiahϊyah wa-al-mawdΰ'ah /in definitione et suUectό)P although they act
in concert in a wide variety of perceptual activities.23
Averroes's argument for the distinction between memory and imagina-
18. Averroes does not explain why his initial fourfold analysis resolves into an
argument for only three faculties, but it is implicitly because the perception and
presentation of an object are taken to be functions of the same faculty. Presumably
Averroes explicitly mentions the presentation of the intention, but not of the image,
simply because his focus is on memory proper rather than on simple imagination.
19. Throughout the text Averroes usually prefers the term al-musawwirah,
"formative faculty," to the term al-mutakhayyilah, "imaginative faculty," although the
latter is used occasionally. The Latin translation almost always has ymaginativa,
whatever the underlying Arabic.
20. Retention (hifz /conservatio) and remembering (dhikr/rememoratio) are dis-
tinguished by Averroes as the acts of continuous versus intermittent retention. See
EPN, A37/L48-49.
21. "As for the judgment... in a human being it belongs to the intellect, for in a
human being [intellect] is the judge byway of affirmation and negation. And in ani-
mals that have memory, it is something like the intellect, because this power is in hu-
mans through cogitation and reflection, and for this reason they can recollect. And as
for the rest of the animals, it is nature, and for this reason animals remember but do
not recollect. And in animals this faculty does not have a name, and it is what
Avicenna calls the estimative [faculty]. And through this power animals naturally flee
what is harmful, even if they have never sensed it before" (EPN, A39/L52).
22. That is, their essential perceptual activities or functions are distinct, and
therefore they require distinct material substrates within the brain.
23. EPN, A39-40/L51-55. It should be noted throughout this initial discussion
that my use of the term "memory-object" reflects Averroes's own ambiguous use of
the term dhikr to mean both the faculty of memory and the act of remembering
(see n. 5 above). Averroes is ultimately arguing that the faculty of memory has a
distinct cognitive object—that is, a distinct aspect of the extramental thing—that
requires its differentiation from the faculty of imagination. But he reaches this
position by analyzing the act of remembering and arguing that its object involves
more than can be explained by imagination alone. Thus, both the complex object
of the act of remembering and the specific aspect of that object, which the faculty
of memory grasps, are "memory-objects" for Averroes.
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tion thus rests on the assumption that an intention is a distinct cognitive
object from an image, a point that he attempts to establish by offering an
analysis of memory-objects in terms of their formal and material compo-
nents. In this analysis, every memory-object involves a material component
or substratum, "which holds the rank of the subject, namely, the outline and
shape," and this is provided by the image; but a memory-object also involves
a formal component, and this is provided by the intention that accompanies
the shape or image. This composition of image and intention in the remem-
bered object in turn reflects the fact that the external thing is itself a
composite of these two elements, that is, of an external outline or shape and
an individual intention.2 4 Initially we might be tempted to take such a
form-matter analysis to indicate an isomorphism between the ontological
constituents of the external thing and the components of the memory-
image that represents it, with the image corresponding to the matter and
the intention to the form of the particular hylemorphic composite.25 But it
is clear from Averroes's subsequent explanation of this composition that he
is not claiming that the form of a material thing yields its intention and the
matter its image.26 Rather, when analyzed in its own terms, the formal and
material components within the memory-object reveal a composition of
intention and image, and something corresponding to these perceptual
components must in turn be present in and conveyed by the external thing.
But the correspondence need not be a mere copying: what is a formal
component in the memory-image viewed in its own right need not be the
formal component of the extramental thing whose memory-image it is.
To explain this form-matter analysis and its bearing on the distinction
between images and intentions, Averroes now provides the reader with an
example of the distinction. The illustration is clearly derived from Aris-
totle's distinction, at De memoήa 450bll-451al4, between an image (phan-
tasma) viewed as an object of consideration (theorema) in its own right and
that same image considered as an eikon—portrait or copy—of something
other than itself.27 For Averroes, however, the image's role as eikon becomes
24. EPN, A40/L54: "This is because the individual outside the soul [al-shakhs
kJiaήj al-nafs/individuum enim extra animam], since it is composite [ murakkaban/com-
positum], happens to be in the soul in this manner."
25. As Coleman does in Ancient and Medieval Memories, p. 405.
26. Averroes's language also makes this unlikely because the material compo-
nent of the memory-image is labeled its "shape" (al-shakl/figura), that is, its physical
form, the equivalent of the Greek μopφή.
27. See especially Zte mem. 1 (450b21-27), translated by Richard Sorabji, Aήstotle
on Memory (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1992), p. 51: "For the figure
drawn on a panel is both a figure and a copy, and while being one and the same, it
is both, even though the being of the two is not the same. And one can contemplate
it both as a figure and as a copy. In the same way one must also conceive the image
in us to be something in its own right and to be of another thing. In so far, then, as
it is something in its own right, it is an object of contemplation or an image. But in
so far as it is of another thing, it is a sort of copy and a reminder." All translations
of the De memoήa are taken from Sorabji.
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transferred to the intention. Hence the property of being an eikon ceases to
be a mere relative or referential aspect of the image itself and becomes
instead a distinct cognitive object in its own right:28
For that which the imaginative faculty perceives of an ostensible
individual Zayd (min shakhs Zaydin al-mushar ilay-hi/de subiecto)29 is only
what the painter describes of him in that which retains,30 whereas that
which the memorative faculty perceives is only the intention of this
description. And for this reason, the intention in the memorative
faculty is more spiritual than it is in the imaginative faculty.31
The allusion to the painter's description of Zayd is clearly derived from Aris-
totle's use of the distinction between pictures and portraits or copies to solve
the dilemma of what makes a memory-image unique. A mere image involves
only the depiction of the external features of the object, of its proper and
common sensible properties such as color, shape, and so on. So the intention
must represent some element within the ostensible individual that is not en-
compassed by its image, and that would seem to leave only its underlying indi-
viduality. Thus the perception of an intention for Averroes would seem to
entail the recognition of an individual precisely insofar as it is an individual.
There is one other important point in the preceding argument for the
distinction between imagination and memory. While the distinction turns
28. The basis for Averroes's argument is clearly the De mem. passage, but his use
of the argument is squarely within the internal sense tradition and in many ways
quite opposed to Aristotle's own perspective here, insofar as Averroes multiplies
faculties and cognitive objects. The temporal focus of the Aristotelian text in
contrast to the purely atemporal and aspectual analysis of Averroes is also notewor-
thy. In Aristotle, the eikon-phantasma contrast arises from an aporia directly linked
to the temporality of memory: if memory is of the past as past, but all forms of
perception must, qua actual, be of what is present, then how can one remember
what is not present? Aristotle thus faces the problem of whether the object of
memory is properly the present affection or the original percept that generated the
memory. But once the temporal element has been erased from Averroes's account,
this aporia is no longer at issue: the intention as such is what one remembers, and
it makes no difference whether it is present, past, or future.
29. Al-musKar ilay-hi, literally, "the thing indicated/pointed to," is the Arabic
translation for the Greek τόδε τi, "this something," and it is standardly rendered as
"ostensible" or "denotable." The Latin version paraphrases rather than translates
this phrase as "subject."
30. I have rendered the active participle, al-hafiz, by the vague phrase "that
which retains" to leave open the possibility that Averroes is referring to the percipi-
ent subject as a whole rather than to the retentive faculty. This would resolve the
apparent anomaly of calling the imagination the retentive faculty, for although it is
true that imagination is retentive of images, this label is traditionally reserved for the
faculty of memory. Moreover, such an anomaly would obscure Averroes's ultimate
intention in the passage cited, which is to prove that while remembering and
retention are two aspects of a single memorative faculty, the faculties of imagination
and memory are distinct in both subject and quiddity.
31.EP/V;A41/L55-56.
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on the recognition that the image and the intention correspond to two
really distinct aspects or components of the remembered object and its
external counterpart, they form a unity of some sort, and both the image
and the intention are assumed to be represented in some way in the
faculties of imagination and memory alike. The intention of the thing is
described by Averroes as being present in the imaginative faculty, as well as
in the memory, and in what follows I hope to show why it must be present,
given the abstractive process that Averroes attributes to the sequence of
internal senses as a whole. Still, despite the presence of intentions in both
faculties, Averroes also tells us here that memory—or rather, the intention
in the memory—is more spiritual, that is, more abstract, than it is in the
imagination. And the reason for this seems to be that it is only in the
memorative faculty that the intention itself actually comes to be perceived.32
MEMORY, ANALYSIS, AND THE GRADES
OF SENSIBLE ABSTRACTION
That memory is the primary locus of the actual perception of the intention
emerges quite clearly from Averroes's ensuing discussion of the first of the
two cognitive activities in which the input of the memorative faculty is
implied, sensible analysis or division (tablil /tafsil /divisiό). "Analysis" is Aver-
roes's term for the process whereby each of the internal senses performs
some act of sensible abstraction. Once again, the notion of abstraction as
intrinsic to sense perception, as well as to intellectual apprehension, has
Aristotelian origins, which crystallize into a more rigid doctrine in the
internal sense tradition. The Aristotelian roots of this doctrine lie in the
well-known claim that sensation (aistKesis) is in general "that which can
receive perceptible forms without their matter," a claim that is followed
immediately by the analogy of wax receiving the impression of a signet
ring.3 3 In Avicenna's cognitive psychology this Aristotelian passage is ech-
oed as the basis for the claim that the totality of human cognitive capacities
comprises a hierarchy of abstractive powers, beginning with the external
senses, proceeding through imagination and estimation, and terminating
in reason or intellect: "It is likely that all perception (idrak) is simply the
taking (akhdh) of the form of the perceived thing in some way; so if the
perception is of a material thing, it is the taking of its form abstracted in
32. Cf. GCDA 2.63, p. 226.57-59, where Averroes says that the intention is "the
very same thing that the imaginative power comprehends, but the imaginative
power comprehends it conjoined to those sensibles" (Έt hec eadem est ilia quam
comprehendit ymaginativa, sed ymaginativa comprehendit earn coniunctam istis
sensibilibus").
33. De an. 2.12 (424al7). All translations of the De anima are taken from D. W.
Hamlyn, Aήstotle's "De anima"Books II, III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
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some way from the matter."34 Given this general definition of abstraction,
the internal ordering of abstractive powers is deduced by Avicenna on the
basis of the relative degrees of dependence on matter within each type of
perceptual act. Sensation is the least abstractive power because it depends
on the material presence of the external object; imagination (al-khayal)35 is
more abstract simply because sensible forms remain in it even in the
absence of the material object itself, even though these forms represent the
material accidents of the object; and estimation is the most abstract of the
sensible faculties because its intentions are properties that are not them-
selves material, although the estimation always represents them in conjunc-
tion with material forms.36 Neither the compositive imagination nor the
memorative faculty is mentioned by Avicenna as occupying a special abstrac-
tive grade of its own.
Averroes follows the general contours of the Avicennian paradigm,
accepting that all forms of cognition involve abstraction or analysis and that
these abstractive processes can be hierarchically arranged from the most
material to the most formal and abstract. But since his understanding of the
distinctions among the individual apprehensive powers within the abstrac-
tive hierarchy differs from Avicenna's, his understanding of the abstractive
scheme itself differs accordingly. In general terms the process of sensible
analysis for Averroes encompasses the various stages involved in the percep-
tion of any sensible particular. In Averroes's own terms, "Analysis and
division are only concerned with the definition of the sensible thing inas-
much as (ma dama/dum) it is sensible."37 Averroes sketches the respective
roles of each of the four internal senses in the act of analysis as follows:
This occurs by the sense first perceiving the thing outside the soul,
then the formative faculty [i.e., the imagination] forming [an image]
of it, then the discriminative faculty [i.e., the cogitative faculty] distin-
guishing the intention of this form from its description. And then the
retentive faculty receives (yaqbalu/recipit) what the discriminative fac-
ulty had distinguished.38
In thus dividing the labor among the internal senses, the only activity that
Averroes explicitly attributes to the cogitative faculty is that of separating or
abstracting the intention from the image. In virtue of the discriminative
34. Avicenna, Shifa': De anima 2.2, p. 58; Liber de anima, vol. 1, p. 114; cf.
Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology, p. 38 (for discussion of this aspect of the internal
sense tradition, see pp. 96-97); Blaustein, Averroes on Imagination and Intellect, pp.
82-85.
35. This is the formative imagination (al-musawwirah), the storehouse of sen-
sible forms, rather than the compositive imagination.
36. Avicenna, Shija': De anima 2.2, pp. 58-61; Liber de anima, vol. 1, pp. 114-19;
cf. Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology, pp. 38-40.
37. EPN, A41/L56.
38. EPN, A41-42/L56-57.
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activity of the cogitative faculty, the intention is able to be understood in
isolation from its corresponding image. But here and in the remainder of
the text the perception of the intention is never attributed to the cogitative
faculty, whereas this is often said to be the distinctive mark of the memora-
tive faculty.39 This faculty is said to receive the intention, not merely to store
or preserve the intention as something already known. It is now my aim to
show that only by attending to this point can Averroes's claim that memory
is the highest and "most spiritual" of the internal sense powers, a claim that
he makes in the continuation of this passage and elsewhere in his psycho-
logical writings, be given a coherent and nontrivial interpretation:
And for this reason there are five grades here. The first of them is
corporeal, having many rinds, and it is the sensible form outside the
soul. And the second grade is the existence of this form in the common
sense, and it is the first of the spiritual grades. The third grade is its
existence in the imaginative faculty, and it is more spiritual than the
first. The fourth grade is its existence in the discriminative faculty, and
the fifth is its existence in the memorative faculty. And this is the most
spiritual of them, for memory receives (fa-inna-ha taqbalu/recipit enim)
the fruit which the three [other powers] have distinguished and
cleansed of its rinds.40
The fruit-rind metaphor, which is used here and recurs throughout Aver-
roes's account of the internal senses, is meant to capture the claim that the
intention of the perceived thing is distinct from its imagined shape or
outline, as Averroes tells us in the first chapter of the Epitome of the "Parva
naturalia, "which corresponds to Aristotle's De sensu et sensato.41 Memory is
explicitly said to be the most spiritual internal sense faculty because in it
alone the fruit is received, purified of all its rinds. The actual reception of
this "fruit" is unique to the memorative faculty—it is not attributed to the
cogitative faculty first and thereafter to the memorative faculty as a simple
39. The same basic picture of the roles of the cogitative and memorative
faculties in the process of sensible abstraction is preserved in the later GCDA 2.63,
pp. 225.54-226.57, where Averroes says that the cogitative faculty "separates" (dist-
inguit) and "abstracts" (expoliat) the individual intentions from the imagined forms
of the common and proper sensibles and "deposits" (reponit) them in the memory.
40. EPN, A42-43/L58-59. Cf. GCDA 3.6, pp. 415.56-416.79: "And he posits the
memorative as more spiritual, then the cogitative, then the imaginative, and after-
wards the sensible."
41. jEPJV, A33/L42: "And this is because in the human being the differences of
things and their proper intentions are perceived. And these are the things which
hold the rank, in the sensible thing, of the core of the fruit, whereas in the animal,
only things which are external are perceived, these being that whose relation to the
things is the relation of the rind to the core of the fruit," Of course, the implication
of this passage—and of the cogitative faculty's role in the process of sensible
abstraction—is that nonhuman animals will not only be denied the capacity for
recollection but also not have memory itself in any proper sense.
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storehouse. Taken at his word, then, Averroes is claiming that only in
memory is the individual grasped in its individuality. To remember some-
thing is not primarily to recognize it as a past object of perception but to
comprehend it as this particular thing. I cannot remember something
unless I recognize it, not as a random collection of sensible qualities, but as
a determinate individual distinct from all other such individuals, or in
Aristotle's terms, as an eiKon, as well as a phantasma.
ABSTRACTION AND RECEPTION: ANALOGUES TO
ANALYSIS IN THE INTELLECT
Thus far, I have made my case for this interpretation of Averroes's view of
memory on purely exegetical grounds: Averroes explicitly declares that
memory is the highest of the internal sense faculties because of its unique
role in the grasping of intentions. But it has traditionally been as-
sumed—principally on the basis of the commonsense assumption that to
distinguish x from y, one must have a prior perception of both x and
y4 2—that Averroes must hold that the cogitative faculty first grasps the
intention before depositing it in the memory. Memory's claim to greater
spirituality must then be interpreted in a different way, and it is easiest to
assume that insofar as memory has a retentive function analogous to that
of the imagination, it is likewise more spiritual than the cogitative faculty in
the same way that imagination is more spiritual than sensation. Since the
imagination is considered more spiritual than sensation because it is inde-
pendent of the material presence of the external sensible object, by parity of
reasoning memory can be seen as more spiritual than the cogitative faculty
because it is able to retain an intention in the absence of the cogitative
faculty's conscious consideration of that intention.4 3
42. Apart from common sense, there is also Aristotelian background in the
discussion of sensible discrimination at De an. 3.2 (426b8-427al5). Blaustein, Aver-
roes on Imagination and Intellect, pp. 108-9, may well have the Aristotelian back-
ground in mind since he uses Averroes's analogy between the discriminative
capacities of the common sense and the cogitative faculty to support the claim that
the cogitative faculty is aware of intentions.
43. Thus Blaustein, Averroes on Imagination and Intellect, p. 85, argues, "Presum-
ably (Averroes does not say so), memory is most abstract because it retains the
individual intention even after the cogitative faculty has ceased paying attention to
the associated imaginative form."
Averroes's followers in the medieval Latin tradition, such as John of Jandun,
also assumed that the cogitative faculty is a percipient faculty and memory simply
its storehouse. See, for example, Super libros Aήstotelis De anima (Venice, 1587;
Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966), p. 214: "Primo, quidem de ista virtute [scil.
cogitativa] dicit Commentator in secundo huius, quod ipsa cognoscit intentiones,
id est formas indiuiduales omnium decem praedicamentorum, ut formam indi-
uidualem huius hominis, secundum quod hie homo, et hanc lineam . . . et huius-
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But whatever the commonsense appeal of this claim, it does not cohere
with what Averroes actually says makes memory the most spiritual of all
faculties. Moreover, it is not required by the principles of Averroes's general
theory of cognition nor warranted by the vocabulary that he uses to de-
scribe the respective activities of the cogitative and memorative faculties. As
I have already noted, Averroes almost always describes memory as a receptive
faculty and cogitation as a compositive or discήminative one.44 And in his
overall account of cognition (as in its Aristotelian roots), it is the passive act
of receiving a form, not the active process of abstracting it, that constitutes
the act of understanding, that is, grasping the nature of the object known.
This is, of course, most evident in both Averroes's and Aristotle's
accounts of the potential or material intellect, which "is of this kind by
becoming all things."45 It is the potential intellect in an Aristotelian episte-
mology that explains how we become affected by and aware of an intelligi-
ble object. While this should be obvious from the basic structure of
Aristotle's own cognitive theory, Averroes himself several times makes ex-
plicit the links between reception, comprehension, and understanding. In
comment 7 of book 3 of the Great Commentary on the "De anima, " for exam-
ple, when describing the preparatory functions of the internal senses in
relation to intellectual understanding, Averroes explicitly gives "to receive"
(recipere) as a synonym for "to comprehend" (comprehendere): "And all these
[internal sense] faculties help each other to present the image of the
sensible thing, so that the abstract rational power may look upon it and
extract the universal intention, and afterwards receive, that is, comprehend
it."46 Similarly, in the description of the abstractive process in his commen-
tary on De anima 3.5, Averroes distinguishes "abstraction" (abstrahere) from
"reception" (recipere) and "understanding" (intelligere):
modi plura ita quod non tantum cognoscit accidentia sensibilia communia et
propria, sed intentionem non sensatam, et exspoliat earn ab eis, quae fuerunt ei
coniuncta de sensibilibus communibus et propriis . . . . Unde per tuam virtutem
cogitatiuam tu cognoscis, quod haec anima non est idem cum hoc corpore, et hoc
manifestum est. Et etiam, quod haec amicitia non est idem cum hoc colore, vel cum
hac magnitudine, vel motu, vel huiusmodi, et ipsam intentionem reponit cogitatiua
in virtute memoratiua, ut dicit Commentator."
44. The application of the term "reception" (qubΰl/receptio) to memory also
occurs in the earlier analysis in the EPNoί the elements involved in memory-images.
The activities of presentation (ifydar /facit presentaή), assigned to memory and imagi-
nation, are called acts of reception, and they are contrasted with the act of compo-
sition (tarakkub/compositiό) proper, assigned to the cogitative faculty: "This is
because the individual outside the soul (al-shakhs khaήj al-nafs/individuum extra
animam), since it is composite, happens to be in the soul in this way, and the
reception of the two parts from which it is composed belongs to two different
faculties and the composition of the two to a third faculty" (EPN, A40/L54).
45. Dean. 3.5 (430al4-15).
46. GCDA 3.7, p. 419.59-63: Έt omnes iuvant se ad presentandum ymaginem
rei sensibilis, ut aspiciat earn virtus rationalis abstracta et extrahat intentionem
universalem et postea recipiat earn, idest comprehendat earn."
MEMORY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AVERROES 175
And it was necessary to ascribe to us these two actions of the soul,
namely to receive the intelligibles and to produce them ... on account
of the fact that these two actions, namely, to abstract intelligibles and
to understand them, are reduced to our will. For to abstract is nothing
other than to make the imagined intentions understood in actuality
after they were in potency; but to understand is nothing other than to
receive these intentions.4 7
In both these passages, reception is the cognitive activity that is proper to
the potential intellect, and it is clearly distinguished from the abstractive
activity of the agent intellect when it extracts the universal essence from the
particular image. It is my contention, then, that Averroes intends the
cogitative faculty to perform a function analogous to the function played by
the agent intellect on the level of universal understanding, and the memo-
rative faculty to be the analogue of the potential intellect. If this is the case,
the cogitative faculty, at least in its discriminative capacity within the process
of analysis, need not and, indeed, cannot properly be said to understand or
comprehend the intention prior to conveying it to the memory, just as the
agent intellect, in Averroes's noetic theory, cannot be said to know, in any
standard sense of the term, the universals that it abstracts.48
THE SYNTHETIC ACTIVITIES THAT INVOLVE MEMORY
In addition to the basic activity of sensible abstraction or analysis, Averroes
identifies a second cognitive activity that involves the memorative faculty,
which he labels "synthesis" or "composition" {al-tartib/compositio). It is clear
that the distinction between analysis and synthesis as it is used in this text
serves primarily to differentiate memory's role as a special internal sense
faculty, with its own proper cognitive operation in all acts of sensible abstrac-
tion, from its standard role in the explanation of the process whereby the
retrieval and restoration of past perceptions is effected. Analysis pertains to
47. GCDA 3.18, p. 439.71-78: Έt fuit necesse attribuere has duas actiones
anime in nobis, scilicet recipere intellectum et facere eum . . . propter hoc quia hee
due actiones reducte sunt ad nostram voluntatem, scilicet abstrahere intellecta et
intelligere ea. Abstrahere enim nichil est aliud quam facere intentiones ymaginatas
intellectas in actu postquam erant in potentia; intelligere autem nichil aliud est
quam recipere has intentiones."
48. For Averroes's views on the nature of the agent intellect and its relation to
the material intellect, see especially GCDA 3.19, pp. 440.6-443.91. For a comprehen-
sive consideration of the role of the agent intellect in his philosophy, see H. A.
Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theoήes of the
Active Intellect and Theoήes of Human Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992),
pp. 220-57, 315-56.
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the first of these two roles, synthesis to the second.49 This is evident from
the very fact that Averroes's treatment of synthesis is developed in the
section of the Epitome of the "Parva naturalia" that is devoted to recollec-
tion.50 However, synthesis is not restricted by Averroes to these more stand-
ard activities that are associated with memory. Rather, the retrieval of past
perceptions through recollection is treated by Averroes as only one possible
application of these synthetic activities of the internal senses. Along with
remembering and recollecting, he includes the creative exercise of the
imagination among the activities to which memory contributes.
Averroes's analysis of how the internal senses cooperate in the process
of synthesis makes it clear why these apparently disparate activities have
been grouped together as part of a consideration of the nature of mem-
ory. For according to Averroes, remembering, recollecting, and the fic-
tional or creative uses of imagination all require the input of the same
three faculties responsible for sensible abstraction—imagination, cogita-
tion, and memory. To remember or consciously to recollect a past per-
ception, it is necessary to recover and recombine the elements that were
initially abstracted by these three faculties: imagination must re-present
the description of the sensible qualities of the object to be remembered
or recollected; memory must make its intention present again; and the
cogitative or discriminative faculty must recombine them into a single
memory image, reuniting what it had previously discriminated "since the
composer is also the divider."51 Following Aristotle's views on recollection,
Averroes claims that these synthetic operations of the internal senses are
unique to humans since they require the influence of the rational soul,
whereas the analytic activities of sensible abstraction involve only the ani-
mal soul's exercise of its own proper functions. Despite the involvement
of reason, however, Averroes does not claim that it is the intellectual fac-
ulty that actually composes the images and the intention. The internal
senses are clearly responsible for both the actual presentation of the in-
dividual components and their synthesis. What Averroes attributes to rea-
son here is simply the ability to harness and consciously to direct the
activities of the animal faculties. For when he explains the requisite in-
volvement of the intellect, he mentions nothing other than the internal
senses' "obedience to reason."52 Thus neither here nor in the basic ana-
49. See EPN, A41/L56: "And therefore the action of this faculty with respect to
the sensible form is either one of two actions, synthesis or analysis, such that
whenever it recovers the form which it had sensed [before], then its action is
synthesis."
50. EPN, A43/L59-60: "And it is clear that retention (al-hifz /retentiό) is nothing
but the continuity (istishab /continuatio) of the existence of the intention of the
sensible in this faculty without interruption; that forgetting is its departure [from
this faculty]; remembering (al-dhikr/rememoratio) is its return after having been
forgotten; and recollection {al-tadhakkur/investigatio rememorationis, [reminiscentia-
parisiana]) is its recovery, and is proper to human beings."
51.£PiV,A44/L60.
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lytic process of sensible abstraction does Averroes assign to the cogitative
faculty any activity other than the actual combination or division of the
image and intention.
As I have already noted, Averroes holds that in addition to recollection,
creative imagination—or more accurately, the representation of sensible
objects that the percipient herself has not actually experienced in the
past—also requires the intellect's facilitation of a parallel cooperation
among imagination, memory, and cogitation: "And not only does the pres-
entation of something which had been sensed and forgotten come about
from the conjoining of these faculties and their mutual cooperation, but in
some people the forms of sensible things which have not been sensed
before may also be presented when these faculties are conjoined, although
their descriptions alone are conveyed to them."53 Averroes gives the exam-
ple of someone who had never actually seen an elephant having the ability
to imagine one accurately, simply based on its description.54
52. EPN, A45/L63: "And this happens only to humans, while these three
faculties are united. And their unity only occurs in virtue of the rational soul, that
is, in virtue of their obedience to it" (min qibal ta (at-ha la-ha/per obedientiam earum
ad ipsam).
53. EPN, A45/L62. Cf. GCDA 3.33, p. 476.51-57: "For as has been shown in the
De sensu et sensato, when the cogitative power cooperates with the informative and
memorative powers, it is naturally able to present, from the images of things,
something which it had never sensed, in accordance with the same disposition in
which it would have been if it had sensed it, by assent and conceptualization. And
then the intellect will judge those images by a universal judgment." The same point
is made in the chapter on imagination (al-takhayyul, taken broadly in this context
for the entire collection of internal sense powers) in the EDA, p. 60: "Moreover, we
are also able through this power to compose things which we have not yet sensed,
but rather, which we have only sensed singly, such as our conception of goat-stag
and of ghoul, and of what is like them among the things which have no existence
outside the soul, but which this power merely fabricates. And it is likely that this is
one of the activities of this power which is proper to human beings. And we will
explain in the De sensu et sensato the things which separate humans from the other
animals in these powers, and one animal from another, as well as the things which
they share in common."
54. EPN, A45/L62-63. The example is attributed to Aristotle himself, as is the
entire account of certain "ancients" who could form images of things they had never
seen on the basis of verbal descriptions. The example of the elephant is found
earlier in Ibn Bajjah's (Avempace's) TadRr al-mutawabhid {Governance of the Soli-
tary), ed. M. Fakhry, in Ibn Bajjah: Opera metaphysica (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1968), p.
61, to whom Averroes is clearly indebted for many of his views on the internal
senses. Perhaps the example is loosely inspired by Aristotle's discussion, at De mem.
1 (451a2-12), of people who cannot distinguish their fictional images from true
memories. Averroes's attribution of this example to Aristotle may be explained by
the Arabic text of the Parva naturalia, which seems to differ from the text as we
know it today. On this point see S. Pines, "The Arabic Recension of Parva naturalia
and the Philosophical Doctrine Concerning Veridical Dreams According to al-RisΊila
al-Manamiyya and Other Sources," Israel (Mental Studies 4 (1974): 104-53; Gatje,
"Die 'inneren Sinne,' " pp. 264-65.
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Initially, from Averroes's allusion in this passage to simple descriptions
of the object to be imagined, it might seem that there are no intentions
involved here. After all, the elephant example would appear to parallel
Aristotle's own example of an image that is nothing but a picture, in contrast
to a portrait, copy, or likeness (eiKόri). But the fact that memory is implicated
in the process suggests that there must be an intention involved, for Averroes
has explicitly associated memory with intentions. And given his interpreta-
tion of an intention in his account of analysis, it is not only consistent but also
absolutely essential that any definite, determinate image we entertain (i.e.,
any image that is not just a patch of color or a discrete smell or taste, etc.)
must always be accompanied by some sort of intention if it is to represent an
individual. If I imagine something like Averroes's elephant on the basis of
someone else's description of its size, shape, color, and so on, then even if I
have not experienced that thing myself I must supply some sort of intention
on the basis of my own perceptions in order to meet the condition of unity
required to make this description the representation of an individual thing.
Only through an intention can a series of discrete images be linked together
to form a single, unified sensible object.
The inclusion of memory as a faculty involved in creative imagination,
as well as in remembering and recollecting, is obviously facilitated by the
freeing of memory from any necessary connection with the awareness of
past time. Such a move would not be intelligible—indeed, it would pose
great difficulties for Averroes's cognitive psychology—were memory to be
regarded as merely a retentive capacity for storing past sensible experience.
For if memory were tied to the perception of the past as past, and not to
the entertaining of images as representations of concrete individuals, then
Averroes would be able to offer no cogent account of how veridical memo-
ries differ from the hallucinatory experiences of fictional images. That is, if
memory were still tied to an awareness of the past, then its new role in the
creative acts of imagination would presumably entail that every fictional,
nonempirical image that I create would be represented as something that I
had once experienced. But when memory is tied only to intentions, there
is room left for me to supply an analogous intention to unite the new cluster
of images into a concrete whole, without my thereby being deluded about
the empirical character of that image as a past perception. Averroes's
reinterpretation of memory does not, of course, explain how I can distin-
guish between veridical memories and simple acts of imaginative creativity.
In fact, from the allusions to the role of the intellect in the account of
synthesis, it appears that such an explanation cannot be given entirely from
the side of the internal sense faculties themselves. Rather, this determina-
tion seems to demand some adjudication of and direction by the intellect.
But even given the intellect's role, it remains the case that without the basic
interpretation of memory's cognitive function, no explanation at all could
be offered, either through the internal senses or through the intellect,
about how memory could in any way be construed as an integral part of the
MEMORY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AVERROES 179
creative use of imagination without thereby threatening the accuracy of
memory in the representation of what is truly past.
AN OBJECTION: ANALOGUES IN
THE INTELLECT REVISITED
Two possible objections might be made to my overall interpretation of the
respective roles of memory and the cogitative faculty in Averroes's account
of sensible cognition, both of which stem from certain disanalogies between
the activities of the intellect and the internal senses:
1. The respective ranks of the agent and material intellects are the con-
verse of the ranks of memory and cogitation within the sensible grades
of abstraction; that is, the agent intellect is considered by Averroes to
be nobler than the material. But if the cogitative faculty is analogous
in function to the agent intellect, why is it not superior to, and hence
more spiritual than, the faculty of memory, which in my interpretation
is analogous to the material intellect?
2. The judgmental or combinatory function attributed to the cogitative
faculty in the recollective and creative processes is one whose intellec-
tual counterpart clearly belongs to the material, and not to the agent,
intellect.
Both of these difficulties can be resolved by a careful consideration of the
disparities between the respective objects and operations of sensible and
intelligible cognition in Averroes's epistemology. But their resolution also
brings us up against what I argue is a major philosophical impediment to
Averroes's ability to reconcile memory's role in the understanding of indi-
viduals with his overall account of human knowledge.
Principles of Ranking Faculties
Averroes's principle for ordering the abstractive ranks within the internal
sense faculties is never clearly spelled out, except in terms of the fruit-rind
metaphor: an internal sense faculty is more abstract the fewer "rinds" it
contains, and memory is at the summit of the hierarchy because in it the
fruit, that is, the intention, is divested of all its rinds.55 But Averroes does
55. The actual ranking of the internal senses derives from Ibn Bajjah, Govern-
ance of the Solitary, p. 62, who also places memory at the apex of this hierarchy;
unfortunately he, too, gives no rationale for the ranking. Moreover, while memory
is associated with intentions in Ibn Bajjah (see p. 58), this association is not
explicitly called on to explain the spirituality of memory.
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not tell us precisely what a "rind" is; given the link between the "fruit" and
the intention, one would assume that the rinds comprise the various com-
mon and proper sensible qualities of the perceived object. But then it is
unclear how there could be more or fewer rinds in the common sense, for
example, than in the imagination.56 From his general comments on the
relations between the common sense and the imaginative faculty in the
Epitome of the "De anima," it is clear that Averroes holds that one faculty is
more spiritual than another the further its contents are from a material
substratum. Therefore, the imagination is said to be more spiritual than the
common sense because its contents are derived from the traces of sensation
that persist in the common sense itself—traces that thus exist in a spiritual,
rather than a material, state—whereas the contents of the common sense
are directly dependent on contact with external, material objects.57 While
this still does little to explain the meaning of degrees of spirituality within
the various sensible "rinds" themselves, when combined with Averroes's
comments about memory and intentions it suggests an obvious principle
for determining the relative abstractness of the internal sense faculties.
Since none of these faculties reaches the complete abstraction of the uni-
versal as such, their internal ordering must be based on the degree to which
they approximate the various characteristics of universal abstraction and
intellectual apprehension. Thus, one internal sense power can be more
abstract than another in virtue of its dependence on a prior spiritual faculty
of the soul, rather than on external material things, or in virtue of its
concern with the most abstract element within the sensible particular, its
individual intention.5 8
But when Averroes considers the principle of ranking within the intel-
lectual soul itself, where all cognition is universal, abstract, and immaterial,
that ranking can no longer be based on the degree of universality and
abstraction in the cognitive act. Rather, Averroes reverts to the basic claim
that the agent is always nobler than the patient: "And it has already been
shown that the relation of the agent intellect to the potential intellect is in
56. Averroes also confuses matters further when he distinguishes forms that are
easy for the memory to recover from those that are difficult to recover on the basis
of whether or not the forms are received by the common sense "with few rinds"
(£PiV,A47-48/L66).
57. EDA, pp. 62-64: "Moreover, the affection of this power [of imagination]
(inβ^al-Ha) does not come from the sensibles actually [existent] outside the soul,
but rather, from the traces arising from the sensibles in the sensitive power, as we
shall explain later. And to the extent that this is its nature, it is more spiritual . . . .
And in general, there is in the common sense the power to retain the traces of the
sensibles and preserve them. But whenever we posit that the imagination itself is
only concerned with the existence of these traces remaining in the common sense
after the passage of the sensibles . . . so that they have in the matter of the
imagination an existence more spiritual than they have in the common sense, it
follows that we will imagine many things simultaneously."
58. Compare Avicenna's two principles of ranking in the texts cited at nn. 34
and 36 above.
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some way like the relation of the moving principle to the moved matter; but
the agent is always nobler than the patient, and the principle nobler than the
matter."59 Now while the cogitative faculty may perform a role analogous to
the agent intellect insofar as it purifies the individual intention for the
memory, just as the agent intellect abstracts the universal from the particular
image, it is not, strictly speaking, the act of abstraction alone that makes the
agent intellect nobler than the material intellect. The agent intellect is not
nobler simply in virtue of producing specific acts of knowing in the material
intellect but rather because it produces those acts in the material intellect in
virtue of the fact that in its own nature it is always in act. By contrast, while the
cogitative faculty is an agent with respect to the extraction of intentions from
images, it is not in itself always actual, and hence it is not a complete agent
cause' even in the process of sensible analysis. The individual intention,
unlike the universal, is already actually present in the imagined form, and to
this extent the use of the language of abstraction with respect to the internal
senses is misleading. Thus, however helpful the analogy between the agent
intellect and the cogitative faculty may be for understanding Averroes's views
on the internal senses, the principle that the agent is nobler than the patient
fully applies only when the agency or actuality in question is complete, and
this criterion is not met in the case of the cogitative faculty.
Composition and Judgment
We have already noted that Averroes assigns both an abstractive and a
combinatory role to the cogitative faculty in the respective activities of
analysis and synthesis, on the grounds that "the composer is also the di-
vider." Averroes also holds that in synthetic activities the cogitative faculty
"judges" that this intention does indeed belong with this image or set of
images, that is, that these sensible qualities match the physical description
of this particular individual.60
59. GCDA 3.19, p. 442.58-62, referring to Aristotle's use of this principle at
430al9-20: 'αεϊ γαp τiμiώτεpov τό πoioυv τoυ πάσχovτoς καi 'η 'αpχή τής
'ύλης. Cf. EDA, pp. 88-89: "The existence of the material intellect, qua material,
necessarily requires that there always be an intellect existent in actuality which is
not material. And this is clear from the foregoing principles of physics. Moreover,
everything which does not require matter in its proper activity is not material at all.
For this is clear from the fact that this agent only bestows the nature of the
intelligible form insofar as it is an intelligible form. And from this it is clear that this
intellect, the agent intellect, is nobler than the material, and that it is existent per se
as an intellect in actuality always, whether we understand it or not, and that the
intelligible is in every respect in the intellect."
60. In the texts cited at nn. 52 and 53 above, we have also seen some involve-
ment of the intellect in these judgments, although I have argued that the intellect
is not itself the combiner. It is also important to remember that the cogitative faculty
by definition is a human faculty, whose operations, while material and sensible,
always presuppose some interaction with the rational soul.
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Here again there is a certain analogy with the operations of the intel-
lect, to the extent that in the Aristotelian tradition composition is generally
taken to be synonymous with judgment.61 Similarly, Averroes's claim that
the divider and composer must be the same reflects the fact that the
terminology of composition and division is most properly used for the acts
of affirmative and negative judgment. But despite these obvious parallels,
Averroes does not hold that the composer and divider are one when the
division in question is the intellect's act of abstracting because he is ada-
mant that it is the material intellect, not the agent intellect, that is respon-
sible for acts of both judgment or assent and denial or negation. This is
stated forcefully in the Great Commentary on the "De anima," in which Aver-
roes criticizes his predecessor Ibn Bajjah on precisely this point: "But Ibn
Bajjah seemed to concede this proposition to be true in his Farewell Letter®*-
namely, that the power by which we make universal judgments is infinite;
but he supposed this power to be the agent intellect, according to the clear
intent of his language there. But this is not the case; for judgment and
distinction in us are attributed only to the material intellect. "6 3 By parity of
reasoning, one might expect that the cogitative faculty, as compositive,
must, like the material intellect, be the percipient of both the simple
elements that it combines, whether in memorative or in anticipatory and
creative activities.64
This objection can be met most directly by the observation that if the
analogy between the cogitative faculty and the material intellect as compo-
sitive powers were taken as evidence that the cogitative faculty must be the
primary percipient of intentions, then by the same token it would also have
to be the primary and true percipient of sensible images as well. And
neither Averroes's texts nor the views of his predecessors and interpreters
offer any warrant for such a claim.
61. See Dean. 3.6 (430b26-32) πnάDeint. 1 (16alO-19).
62. The work of Ibn Bajjah is the Risalah al-wada' (Epistola expeditionis), which is
edited by Fakhry, Opera metaphysica, pp. 113-43.1 am grateful to Richard C. Taylor
of Marquette University and Therese-Anne Druart of the Catholic University of
America for identifying the Latin reference.
63. GCDA 3.19, p. 442.46-52. Cf. GCDA 3.22, p. 457.37-44: "That is, what makes
these single intelligibles to be one through composition after they had been many
is the material intellect. For it distinguishes single intelligibles, composing those
that are compatible (consimilia) and dividing those that are diverse. For it is neces-
sary that the power comprehending the simples and the composites be the same,
because the relation of that power to the intentions of the imagined forms should
be like the relation of the common sense to the diverse sensibles."
64. In the case of Averroes's polemic against Ibn Bajjah's claims about the role
of the cogitative faculty (cited in the previous note), the problem can easily be
resolved since from the context it is clear that his objection is against an individual,
sensible power acting as the composer of universal forms to which its cognitive
capacities do not extend. He is not concerned with the relationship between the
comprehension of the simple and combination and division but with the general
gap that separates the rational from the sensible soul.
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Moreover, this second disparity between the intellectual faculties and
the internal senses, like the first one, can be explained by a closer examina-
tion of the differences between the cogitative faculty and the agent intellect.
In the case of the intellect, Averroes's claim that the material, and not the
agent, intellect is the composer of universal concepts is required in large
part by the agent intellect's complete transcendence of the order of mate-
rial forms. Because of that transcendence, which is based on the Aristote-
lian assumption that the contemplative activity of separate substances must
be totally self-contained, a vόησis voήσεωs, there can be no sense in which
the agent intellect can be aware of its abstractive activity in relation to
individual human knowers. This lack of awareness on the part of the agent
intellect is not a function of its being the agent of abstraction per se,
however, but rather of the characteristics of separateness and immateriality
that are required by its status as a fully actual intellect. Since these charac-
teristics are not present in the case of the cogitative faculty, as we have
already noted, it will also be possible to admit that an abstractive internal
sense faculty does have some awareness of the intentions and images that it
is combining, even if it is only through the faculty of memory itself that the
individual intention is fully grasped as a distinct object from the image.65
In fact, Averroes's remarks on the scale of sensible abstraction are most
naturally interpreted in just such a fashion. Since the images received by the
senses must transmit the "fruit" of the sensible object as well as its "rinds,"
there must be a sense in which all of the internal senses inchoately possess
the intention that becomes fully apprehended only in memory. While it is
true that, in Averroes's account, the universal is likewise potentially present
in the particular image from which the agent intellect abstracts it, such an
image is not actually a universal intelligible in the way in which an individual
color, sound, or motion is already actually individual. Thus, Averroes can
argue in his discussion of incidental perception in the Great Commentary on
the "De anima" that the "comprehension of the individual intention is not
[proper to the common sense], although it is an action of the common
sense."
66
 For in his view of sensible abstraction, the intention is present in
every common and proper sensible, and for that reason the cogitative
faculty is able to separate it without radically transforming its nature in the
way in which the intellect must transform the nature of the image to make
it a universal intelligible. To this extent, the cogitative faculty, like the other
internal senses, must in some sense contain the images and intentions that
65. The claim that a faculty can be compositive of images without actually
perceiving them is explicitly upheld by one of Avicenna's commentators, Nasr
al-Dϊn al-Tΰsϊ(d. 1274). In his commentary on the Isharat wa-TanUhat (Directives and
Remarks), Tΰsϊ( argues that Avicennian compositive imagination (al-takhayyul) is a
faculty that "has free disposal (tasarruf) over two things whose presence it does not
perceive." For TΰsT's commentary, see the anonymous edition of Avicenna's IsKάrat
wa-TanBhat, 3 vols., 2nd ed., (Tehran: Daftar Nashr Kitab, 1983), vol. 2, p. 45.
66. GCDA 2.65, p. 228.32-34.
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it combines and divides. But in the strictest and most proper sense, the
understanding and awareness of an intention in its own right belongs to the
memory alone, as a receptive faculty for the purified intention.
TIME AND INDIVIDUALITY: INTERPRETING THE
SPIRITUALITY OF MEMORY
In concluding my examination of Aver roes's view of the memorative faculty,
I would like to address the philosophical implications of his transformation
of memory from a faculty that is aware of past perceptions to one that is
perceptive of the individual as individual. In particular, I wish to consider
the question of whether Averroes is justified in claiming that memory is the
most abstract of the sensible faculties in virtue of the fact that it is assigned
the function of grasping the purified individual intention. Does Averroes
adequately explain how or why the "fruit" that is the individual intention
should be such as to render the faculty that receives it the summit of the
sensible soul's abstractive powers?
Answering this question is not an easy matter, however, principally be-
cause of Averroes's ultimate failure both to define the technical notion of an
intention and to articulate how the grasping of such intentions is tied to what
we usually think of as memory-activities. It is clear that Averroes links the
intention with the two related properties of being an individual (shakhs) and
being denotable, a "this something" in Aristotle's terms. While the most
obvious example of such an intention would be an individual substantial
form, the Great Commentary on the "De anima"explicitly allows for "intentions
of each of the ten individual predicaments."67 This wider notion of an inten-
tion is also presupposed a few comments later, when Averroes remarks that
we usually need to rely on the perception of a variety of sensible forms in
order to grasp the intention that underlies them: "And therefore it is often
necessary, in understanding the individual intention, to use more than one
sense, just as doctors, in order to learn whether someone suffering from a
paroxysm of the veins is alive, use more than one sense."68 Thus intentions
include accidental qualities that accrue to the whole individual, such as the
state of being alive or dead, as well as its individuality as such.
Indeed, in the Great Commentary on the "De anima" Averroes generally
invokes intentions in the context of explaining Aristotle's concept of inci-
67. GCDA 2.63, p. 225.44-50.
68. GCDA 2.65, p. 228.34-37. Cf. EDA, p. 27: "As for the incidental sensibles,
such as sensing that this is dead and that is alive, and that this is Zayd and that is
'Umar, error [occurs] in these sensibles more than in the common sensibles. And
for this reason, it is necessary, in discerning them, to use more than one sense, just
as doctors do in the case of someone with a paroxysm of the veins. For they may
bleed him sometimes; and sometimes they may put a mirror up to his nose, so that
the traces of his breathing are made visible in it for them."
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dental perception.6 9 Thus, Averroist intentions serve the role of specifying
just what an incidental percept is over and above the object's common and
proper sensible forms on which the incidental perception supervenes. And
this seems to explain in part their link to the notion of memory. The simple
act of retaining a prior sensible perception is common to both memory and
imagination; what is peculiar to memory is the recognition that some
sensible property belongs to a specific and identifiable individual object.
Thus my possession of an image of the color purple or the scent of jasmine
is simply an act of imagination; but if I recall this particular shade of purple
or that particular jasmine perfume, memory must be supplying an inten-
tion as well. The intention may often include an awareness of the occasion
on which this individual perception occurred—hence the normal associa-
tion of memory with the past—but it need not do so, as in cases of creative
imagination.70 Therefore, although the intention itself need not be of a
substance, as in Averroes's own example of "life," it does seem to be the case
that to perceive an intention presupposes the implicit assignment of the
intentional property grasped to an individual substance of some kind,
whether determinate and real (like "Zayd" or "Diares' son") or fictional.
Once an intention is involved, the associated images are no longer random
instances of properties but the properties of some particular thing!11
So it remains the case that intentions will always be radically individual
in a way that no sensible form taken in isolation can be. Indeed it is the
individuality of intentions that prevents them from being viewed as proper
or common—rather than incidental—sensibles, because if the grasp of
intentions were a function of sensation as such, Averroes argues, this would
limit each external sense to perceiving its proper sensible as the property
of some particular individual: "Vision is not affected by the incidental
sensible intention; because if it were affected by some individual insofar as
it is that individual, it could not be affected by any other individual."72 So if
vision in itself perceived not merely "red" but rather "this red apple" or "that
red book," it would be unable to perceive the red color of any other thing.7 3
Individuality as such, then, exceeds the perceptual abilities of the senses
and imagination as much as do universality and immateriality; hence even
the sensible grasp of the individual requires a special faculty dedicated to
this task.
69. This has already been noted by Blaustein, Averroes on Imagination and
Intellect, pp. 80-81.
70. It could also be argued that pastness is one of the accidental intentions, as
Aquinas does in ST 1.78.4: Έt ipsa ratio praeteriti quam attendit memoria, inter
huiusmodi intentiones computatur."
71. Although again, Averroes never makes such a point explicitly, it seems
implicit in his account; moreover, it seems a natural extension of Aristotle's phan-
tasma-eikon contrast.
72. GCDA 2.65, pp. 228.53-229.55.
73. This is reminiscent of certain standard arguments pertaining to the prob-
lem of universals; for example, if the universal were essentially identical with any one
of its instances, it could not also be common to the remaining instances.
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But can Averroes's claims for memory, based on its capacity to appre-
hend the individual intention, be reconciled with his commitment to the
metaphysical view that matter, which is in itself opaque to the intellect, is
the principle of individuation?74 In such a view of individuation, it is diffi-
cult to see how the memorative faculty's grasp of the intention could
consistently serve as the basis for its claim to be the most spiritual and
abstract of the sensible soul's faculties—that is, the faculty that most closely
approximates the character of intellectual apprehension. One does not
need to look far for texts in the Averroist corpus that uphold the view that
individuating matter is what separates the sensible powers of the human
soul from its abstract intellectual powers: "And the difference between
rational conception and imaginative conception . . . is that we only conceive
of things that are imagined insofar as they are individual and material,"75
and again,
It is evident from the nature of the existence of the forms of intelligi-
bles in humans that their existence in them is different from the
existence of the rest of the forms of the soul in them, because the
existence of these other forms in their ostensible subject (fi mawdΰ'-hά
al-musKarilay-hi) is not [the same as] their intelligible existence, and this
is because [an intelligible form] is one insofar as it is intelligible, and
many insofar as it is an individual existent in matter.76
There appears to be no way around Averroes's claim that it is through the
individuating role of matter that the entire sensible realm is separated from
the intelligible and that precisely because of its independence from such
individuating matter, intellectual cognition alone can be called "abstract" in
the fullest sense of the term. At best, "abstraction" is predicated equivocally
of the operations of the internal sense faculties. And as far as the cognitive
object itself is concerned, Averroes has no explanation of why an individual
intention, if known as individual, will not remain radically material and
74. For a consideration of Averroes's views on individuation along with those
of Avicenna, see Allan Back, "The Islamic Background: Avicenna (B. 980; D. 1037)
and Averroes (B. 1126; D. 1198)," in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle
Ages and the Counter-Reformation 1150-1650, ed. J. J. E. Gracia (Albany: SUNY Press,
1994), pp. 39-67.
75. Averroes is using "imagination" as a generic term for all of the internal
senses here, as is clear from his allusion in the next sentence to the "four grades of
individual intention."
76. EDA, pp. 61, 75; cf, pp. 67-68: "This is something that is evident from what
has been said in many places, that apprehended intentions are of two types, either
universal or particular, and that these two types of intentions are ultimately differ-
ent. And this is because the universal is the perception of the general intention
abstracted from matter, and the individual perception is the perception of the
intention in matter . . . . And in general we cannot imagine sensibles abstracted
from matter, and we only perceive them in matter, this being the respect in which
they are individualized."
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dependent on matter for its comprehension. There is no underlying ab-
stract, ontological principle in individual particulars that accounts for their
individuality, other than their multiplication by matter; and there are no
individual essences or quiddities from which intentions can be derived.
Hence, there is ultimately no real basis in the object that could account for
Averroes's claim that to perceive an individual as an individual is to perceive
something more abstract, and more spiritual, than its physical description.
What, then, is going on in Averroes's account of the spirituality of
memory? The most obvious answer is that in attempting to adapt the notion
of an "intention"—understood in its Avicennian sense as the nonmaterial
accompaniment of a sensible form—to a more strictly Aristotelian frame-
work, Averroes came face to face with the opacity of the individual in
Aristotelian metaphysics.77 He recognized that there is some element in the
cognition of the individual—not as a random instance of a universal or a
random collection of physical properties but as a distinct and integral thing
unto itself—that defies explanation in terms of the standard Aristotelian
split between the universal and the particular, the intelligible and the
sensible, the material and the immaterial. But Averroes had no underlying
desire to break down the ontological barriers on which the dichotomy with
which he was faced was built; and for that reason, he has no consistent
explanation to offer of what it is in the things themselves that memory
grasps when it recognizes an individual of any sort in its individuality.
77. By contrast, Avicenna has an explicit argument in support of the abstract-
ness of estimative intentions as he construes them, that is, as properties that are not
essentially material in themselves but which the estimation perceives as attached to
material individuals. See Al-Najah, p. 347; Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology, pp. 39-40:
"This is because shape, colour, position, &c, are attributes which cannot be found
except in bodily matters, but good and evil, agreeable and disagreeable, &c, are in
themselves non-material entities and their presence in matter is accidental. The
proof of their being non-material is this: If it were of their essence to be material,
then good and evil, agreeable and disagreeable would be inconceivable except as
accidents in a physical body. But sometimes they are conceived in themselves apart
from matter. It is clear that in themselves they are non-material and their being in
matter is entirely by accident." Cf. Shifa': De anima 2.2, pp. 60-61; Liber de anima, vol.
l,pp. 118-120.

